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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
APPEAL AND ERROR - REVIEW - SCOPE AND EXTENT IN
OHIO - QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT
Hawkins v. Hawkins, 176 Ohio St. 469, 200 N.E.2d 300 (1964)
The situations in which Ohio appellate courts may hear appeals on
questions of law and fact' have varied significantly in the last century.
The struggle to enunciate a workable test by which to determine when
such appeals should be allowed has been manifested by a seemingly end-
less stream of constitutional amendments, legislative enactments and ju-
dicial decisions; few of these efforts have met with any success. The un-
derlying problem centers around the inability of the legislature and the
courts to specifically designate the types of cases in which law and fact
appeals can be made to the appellate courts. The recent decision in Haw-
kins v Hawkins2 removes some of the doubt surrounding this question.
It is significant in three respects: (1) the new statutory test for determin-
ing when an appeal on questions of law and fact may be brought was
recognized;3 (2) the constitutionality of section 2501.02 of the Ohio
Revised Code, which enunciates the new test, was suggested; and (3) the
shortcomings of the statute were effectively, if not intentionally, empha-
sized. However, many problems were left unresolved by Hawkins, leav-
ing an unmistakable cloud of uncertainty hovering over the entire sub-
ject of appeals on questions of law and fact. A necessary preliminary
to a discussion of these problems, however, is a brief examination of the
origin of appellate jurisdiction in Ohio.
The jurisdiction of the courts of appeal in Ohio was first prescribed
by article IV, section 6 of the Ohio Constitution. Originally, section 6
granted these intermediate courts "appellate jurisdiction as may be pro-
1. OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.01 distinguishes types of appeal as follows:
(A) "Appeal" means all proceedings whereby one court reviews or retries a cause
determined by another court, an administrative officer, tribunal, or commission.
(B) "Appeal on questions of law" means a review of a cause upon questions in-
cluding the weight and sufficiency of the evidence.
(C) "Appeal on .questions of law and fact" means a rehearing and retrial of a
cause upon the law and the facts and is the same as an "appeal on questions of fact."
2. 176 Ohio St. 469, 200 N.E.2d 300 (1964)
3. OHio REv. CODE § 2501.02. Tis section allows an appeal on questions of law and
fact when the plaintiff seeks as "primary and paramount relief" one of the following:
(1) The construction or enforcement of a trust, including the enforcement or es-
tablishment of constructive or resulting trusts; (2) The establishment or enforce-
ment of equitable estates arising from the conversion of property; (3) The fore-
closure of mortgages and marshalling of liens, including statutory liens; (4) The
appointment, removal, and control of trustees and receivers; (5) The restraint
of commission of torts; (6) The reformation and cancellation of instruments in
writing; (7) The restraint of actAons or judgments at law, (8) The quieting of title
to property, the partition of property, and the registration of land titles; (9) The
specific performance of contracts, or the restraint of the breach thereof; (10) In-
junction, accounting, subrogation, or interpleader.
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vided by law."' Acting upon this grant of authority, the Ohio legislature
in 1852 gave the courts of appeal, then called district courts, jurisdiction
to hear trials de novo in appeals on questions of law and fact and juris-
diction to "reverse, vacate, or modify" judgments where the appeal was
made only on questions of law.5 This broad grant of power eventually
resulted in a hopeless backlog of cases awaiting disposition at the appel-
late level. Section 6 remained substantially unchanged until 1912,6 when
the overcrowded appellate dockets finally necessitated an amendment to
this section.7 The new amendment removed from the legislature the
power to further regulate the jurisdiction of the courts of appeal by
expressly limiting appeals on law and fact to chancery cases. Thus the
General Assembly could regulate only those appeals which were con-
cerned exclusively with questions of law.
The desire for judicial economy that prompted the 1912 amendment
appeared again in 1944 with another alteration of article IV, section 6.
In this amendment, the clause expressly restricting law and fact appeals
to chancery cases was eliminated; however, the drafters of this second
amendment failed to provide any guidelines upon which the legislature
could rely in devising future jurisdictional statutes. The resulting void
provoked a controversy among the courts and legal writers as to the actual
effect of the amendment.? Generally, the disagreement centered around
two questions: (1) whether the legislature actually had any power under
the 1944 amendment to regulate the situations in which law and fact
appeals could be heard in the courts of appeal; and (2) if so, in what situ-
ations could such appeals be heard in the absence of legislation in this
area.
4. Omo CoNsr. art. IV, § 6 (1851).
5. 50 hio Iaws 93 (1852).
6. The form of art. IV, 5 6 was altered by an 1883 amendment to the section which
changed the title of the appellate courts from "district courts" to "crcuit courts."
7. After extensive debate at the Constitutional Convention, the delegates drafted the amend-
ment so as to grant the courts of appeal "appellate jurisdiction in the trial of chancery
cases [and the jurisdiction) to review, affirm, modify, or reverse the judgments of the
Courts of Common Pleas, Superior Courts, and other courts of record within the district as may
be provided by law " OHIO CONST. art. PV, § 6 (1912). For an extensive treatment
of the historical aspects of appeals on questions of law and fact, see Weiss v. Kearns, 117 Ohio
App. 393, 191 N.E.2d 552 (1963).
8. The new language gave the courts of appeal "such jurisdiction as may be provided by
law to review, affirm, modify, set aside, or reverse judgments or final orders of boards, com-
missionsj officers, or tribunals, and courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within
the district." Oio CoNsr. art. IV, 5 6 (1944). At the time of passage, the amendment also
provided that "all laws now in force not inconsistent herewith shall continue in force until
amended or repealed " This clause was specifically omitted by a 1959 amendment to art.
IV, § 6.
9. Compare Weiss v. Kears, 117 Ohio App. 393, 191 N.X.2d 552 (1963), with Buckeye
Union Cas. Co. v. Braden, 116 Ohio App. 348, 188 N.E.2d 300 (1962); see Ross, Some
Comments on Changes in Ohio Procedure, 31 Oo Op. 358 (1945); Gardner, What did
the 1944 Amendment to the Constitution Do to the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals?,
31 OiMo Op. 561 (1945) (opposing Ross' view).
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The Ohio Supreme Court partially resolved both questions in Youngs-
town Municipal Ry. v Youngstown."° There it was held that the Gen-
eral Assembly could change the appellate jurisdiction of the courts of
appeal, but that if it chose not to do so the "chancery case" test which was
used before the 1944 amendment remained in force. The continued ap-
plication of this test by the courts, however, resulted in a considerable
amount of time spent in determining what constituted a chancery case.
Such a determination diverted the court's attention from the substantive is-
sues being litigated." However, those who claimed that the 1944 amend-
ment had abolished law and fact appeals denied that the Youngstown de-
cision recognized the legislature's power to correct the situation; it was
argued that the right to change the appellate jurisdiction of the courts of
appeal did not necessarily include the power to regulate cases in which
law and fact appeals could be made.'2 Thus the Youngstown decision
failed to terminate the controversy concerning the legislature's power
under the 1944 amendment. In fact, even the subsequent enactment of
section 2501.02," wherein the General Assembly attempted to enumerate
the instances in which appeals on law and fact could be brought, did
not quiet the claims that such attempts were unconstitutional under the
1944 amendment. 4
Whether the supreme court would pay mere lip service to the new
test for allowing appeals on law and fact questions, or more importantly
whether it would even recognize the constitutionality of the statute which
enunciates the new test was not known until the court's decision in the
Hawkins10 case. There, the plaintiff filed an action in the probate court
praying that the court enter a declaratory judgment holding invalid and
void a purported ante-nuptial agreement and give the plaintiff her in-
testate share of her deceased husband's estate. The probate court found
the agreement valid and ruled for the defendants. 6 The court of ap-
peals dismissed plaintiff's appeal on questions of law and fact and af-
firmed the judgment of the probate court on questions of law " The
10. 147 Ohio St. 221, 70 N.E.2d 649 (1946).
11. Westerhaus Co. v. Cincinnati, 165 Ohio St. 327, 333, 135 NE.2d 318, 323 (1956)
In this decision, the court expressly denounced the time-consuming deliberations which were
required in determining procedural issues and recognized § 2501.02 as a possible solution to
the problem.
12. E.g., Skeel, Some Aspects of Appellate Procedure in Ohio, 12 W RES. L REV. 645, 654
(1961). The author also points out that the Youngstown decision relied heavily on the
clause of the 1944 amendment, which was omitted by a subsequent amendment in 1959. See
note 8 supra.
13. See note 3 supra.
14. See Buckeye Union Cas. Co. v. Braden, 116 Ohio App. 348, 188 N.E.2d 300 (1962)
15. 176 Ohio St. 469, 200 N.E.2d 300 (1964).
16. Hawkins v. Hawkins, Civil No. 605,719, Cuyahoga County P Ct., Aug. 21, 1962.
17 94 Ohio L. Abs. 19 (Ct. App. 1962).
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Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, holding that appeals on.questions of law
and fact were restricted to cases falling within the classes designated in
section 2501.02 of the Ohio Revised Code."8 In utilizing the tests of this
statute, the court held that because plaintiff was seeking as a "primary
and paramount relief" her share of decedent's estate, rather than the mere
cancellation of an instrument, the appeal did not fall within any of the
classes set forth in section 2501.02."9
The majority opinion in Hawkins failed to comment on the constitu-
tionality of the statute, possibly because neither litigant chose to discuss
this question in its brief. However, the court's application of the tests set
out in the statute suggests that the constitutionality of section 2501.02
will be upheld should it ever be challenged. This conclusion is strength-
ened. by the court's previous pronouncements in Youngstown Municipal
Ry. v. Youngstown," and Westerhaus Co. v. Cincinnati.2' In the latter
decision, the court expressly recognized section 2501.02 as a possible solu-
tion to the problem of determining when law and fact appeals could be
made. This recognition at least imaplies that the court believed the statute
to be within the permissible scope of the 1944 amendment. Such an in-
terpretation of section 6 seems to be wiser than the contention that the
amendment itself abolished all appeals on questions of law and fact. The
legislature, by retaining the power to regulate such appeals, can adjust the
situations in which these proceedings are allowed, thereby providing effi-
cient, up-to-date, appellate jurisdiction in the Ohio Courts of Appeal.
While the Hawkins decision may leave something to be desired by
its failure to expressly decide the constitutional question, the opinion is
emphatically clear on the point that the "chancery case" test has been re-
placed by the provisions of section 2501.02 2 But regardless of the ir-
18. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 176 Ohio St. 469, 200 N.E.2d 300 (1964). 'The court also ruled
that "a party is prohibited, over objection, from examining an adverse party as if under cross-
examination when one of the adverse parties is an administrator or claims or defends as.heir,
grantee, assignee, devisee or legatee of a deceased person." Id. at 472-73, 200 N.E.2d at*303.
19. The plaintiff would have been allowed to appeal on law and fact had she merely sought
the cancellation of an instrument; this is one of the tests enumerated in § 2501.02. See note
3 supra. But her real objective in the litigation is not clear. In arguing that the probate
court had original jurisdiction of the action, the plaintiff had previously claimed that the
action was not in equity and therefore not within the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas court;
the probate court agreed. Hawkins v. Hawkins, Civil No. 605,719, Cuyahoga County P. Ct.,
October 30, 1961. And yet, in order to prevail in the supreme court on the question of
law and fact appeals, the plaintiff had to claim that she sought the cancellation of the instru-
ment as a "primary and -paramount relief." If the supreme court had so found, the earlier
jurisdictional ruling by the probate court would dearly have been in error. But the error,
since it was induced by the plaintiff, would not have'been appealable by her. Brief for De-
fendant-Appellee, pp. 8-9, Hawkins v. Hawkins, supra note 18.
20. 147 Ohio St. 221, 70 N.E.2d 649 (1946).
21. 165 Ohio St. 327, 333, 135 N.E.2d 318, 323 (1956).
22. On this point, the court stated that "it is apparent now that the determination of the
question whether an appeal is one on questions of law and fact or on questions of law only
is entirely controlled by statute. Section 2501.02 of the Revised Code. Decisions prior to
1965]
